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WIPING AWAY THE TIERS OF
JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
R. GEORGE WRIGHT†
INTRODUCTION
Throughout much of constitutional law and beyond, courts
often decide cases by applying some form of tiered or multilevel
judicial scrutiny.1 Tiered scrutiny exhibits remarkable variability
and complexity.2 At its simplest, tiered scrutiny involves a judicial
inquiry into the legitimacy and the degree of importance of some
public goal purportedly furthered by the government policy at
issue. The courts then typically undertake a second step,
inquiring into the degree of “tailoring” of the government policy—
namely the policy’s overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness
relative to its supposed purpose.3 This simplified account of tiered
scrutiny conceals, however, a number of important problems. The
undue complications, manipulability, oft-mistaken emphases, and
other costs of tiered scrutiny are, by now, conspicuous and
remarkable. Tiered scrutiny review has decayed to the point to
which its use is no longer justifiable.
Among other basic problems, tiered scrutiny now offers only
the appearance, but not the reality of, reasonable efficiency and
appropriate constraint on judicial subjectivity and discretion. The
practice of tiered scrutiny today clearly undermines several basic
rule of law principles.4 This Article suggests that a simpler, more
†
Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney
School of Law.
1
See generally R. George Wright, What If All the Levels of Judicial Scrutiny Were
Completely Abandoned?, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 165 (2014).
2
See id. at 170. For a sense of the historical development of the levels of judicial
scrutiny, see generally Tara Leigh Grove, Tiers of Scrutiny in a Hierarchical
Judiciary, 14 GEO. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 475 (2016); G. Edward White, Historicizing
Judicial Scrutiny, 57 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2005).
3
For a relatively simple, but self-conscious and probing, application of a tiered
scrutiny schema, see the explicit sex discrimination case of Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976) (applying a version of what is classified as intermediate scrutiny to
the state statute at issue).
4
For standard, and quite substantially overlapping, multiple-element accounts of
the rule of law, see TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW (Penguin Books 2011) (2010).
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rule of law-friendly substitute for tiered scrutiny is realistically
available,5 and that such a substitute encourages more pragmatic
lawmaking.6
This Article thus recommends replacing today’s readily
manipulable and otherwise crucially defective tiered scrutiny
analysis with a substitute requiring fewer and better-working
parts. In particular, this Article recommends a stronger judicial
concern for a legislative policy’s actual effectiveness in practice
and far less concern for questions of tailoring.7 This Article
also recommends a more serious judicial accommodation of
constitutionally fundamental rights.8
See also JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 270–71 (2d ed. 2011); LON
L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW ch. 2 (2d ed. 1969); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE
RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 80–83, 90 (2004); Marc O. DeGirolami,
Faith in the Rule of Law, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 573, 578–79 (2008); Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
47-48 (1997); Robert S. Summers, The Principles of the Rule of Law, 74 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1691, 1704-06 (1999); Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43
GA. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2008). A fuller account of typical presentations of the rule of law
values appears infra at note 141.
5
See infra Parts II–III.
6
See infra Parts II–III. For some ironic complications of the idea of simplicity, see
R. George Wright, The Illusion of Simplicity: An Explanation of Why the Law Can’t
Just Be Less Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 715, 735 (2000).
7
Importantly, the degree of “tailoring” of the government policy to the scope of
the problem sought to be remedied by that policy, as a matter of degrees of
overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness, may actually have little to do with the
severity or the constitutional insignificance of the policy’s impact on persons
inadvertently affected by the policy. See infra notes 58–69 and accompanying text.
Degrees of tailoring between the scope of a perceived problem and the scope of the
persons or interests actually affected by the policy at issue can be thought of in terms
of typical Venn diagram degrees of overlapping, or lack thereof. See, e.g., What is a
Venn Diagram, LUCIDCHART, https://www.lucidchart.com/pages/venn-diagram (last
visited Oct. 12, 2019). But overlap, or degrees of overlap, in this “tailoring” sense, tells
us virtually nothing about the nature, severity, or significance of the government
policy’s actual impact on any affected party. See infra notes 58–69 and accompanying
text. A Venn diagram tells us about a merely two-dimensional overlap, but nothing
about the three-dimensional depth, severity, gravity, inescapability, impact, or the
mere superficiality of that overlap. See infra notes 58–69 and accompanying text. The
real severity of any burden a policy imposes on an affected party, intentionally or
unintentionally, is in contrast, much more usefully pursued by asking about the value
of any alternative unregulated courses of action still available to the party challenging
the government policy. What can the affected party still do, at appropriate cost? See
infra notes 58–69 and accompanying text. See generally R. George Wright,
Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations of Speech: A Distinction That Is No
Longer Worth the Fuss, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2081, 2090–96 (2015); R. George Wright, The
Unnecessary Complexity of Free Speech Analysis and the Central Importance of
Alternative Speech Channels, 9 PACE L. REV. 57, 77–80 (1989) [hereinafter
Unnecessary Complexity].
8
See infra notes 72–81 and accompanying text.
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The aim of these recommended revisions is to channel
judicial scrutiny in the most useful directions, to simplify and
appropriately constrain judicial analyses, to encourage
substantially effective legislative policies, and to otherwise better
promote basic rule of law values.9 None of these suggested reforms
would authorize courts to usurp the proper legislative role or
otherwise empower courts to stray beyond the area of judicial
competency by second-guessing calculations of policy costs or by
performing general cost-benefit analyses of statutes and
regulations.10
I.

TIERED SCRUTINY’S TYPICAL INDIFFERENCE TO ANY
QUESTIONS OF THE ACTUAL EFFECTIVENESS OF A
CHALLENGED GOVERNMENT POLICY

Where fundamental rights are unaffected and no suspect
legislative classification is employed, courts ordinarily defer to a
legislature’s choice among policy options, at least.11 This general
rule of judicial deference to legislative policy judgments recurs, in
particular, throughout equal protection case law applying what is
known as minimum scrutiny of the legislative choice; this
minimum scrutiny requires merely a rational, and often
presumed, basis for the legislative policy choice.12

9

See infra Parts I–II.
A focus on whether a policy has, in practice, substantially advanced some
government interest does not, as discussed below, involve a broad cost-benefit
assessment. See infra Parts II–III. Similarly, the focus herein deemphasizes mere ex
ante predictions as to how effective a policy will eventually turn out to be in practice.
See infra Parts II–III. Finally, judicial inquiry into whether a given aim has in practice
been substantially advanced does not license courts to assess the degree of importance
of the government interest sought to be advanced. See infra Parts II–III. As it turns
out, significant analytical simplifications can be made at minimal cost in terms of the
attractiveness of the judicial outcome on the merits. This Article then recommends a
further simplification, in the form of avoiding a judicial balancing test, or a test of
proportionality, especially when genuinely fundamental constitutional rights are
being substantially burdened. See infra Parts II–III. For background on judicial
proportionalism, and on “exacting” and “strict” judicial scrutiny, see R. George Wright,
A Hard Look at Exacting Scrutiny, 85 UMKC L. REV. 207, 207–08 (2016). For a classic
defense of the status of genuinely fundamental rights, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY XI, 192 (1977).
11
See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1970).
12
See, e.g., Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313; Dandridge, 397 U.S. at
484–85.
10
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Thus the idea of equal protection, in particular, is typically
“not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic
of legislative choices.”13 Judicial resistance to “second-guess”
legislative policy choices, absent any concern for fundamental
rights or suspect legislative classifications, recurs throughout
much of the pertinent case law.14 Otherwise put, courts do not “sit
as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of
legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect
fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines.”15
This judicial deference thus extends to questions of the
“wisdom, fairness, [and] logic”16 of the legislative choice. Typically,
courts will not require a legislature to attack any social or
economic ill in its full scope; a legislature may instead single out
one aspect of a perceived problem without committing to any

13
Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
632 (1996).
14
See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721,
753–54 (2011) (public financing of elections); Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 198 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488–90 (2005) (a
major eminent domain case reaffirming judicial deference to state governmental
judgments without second-guessing their wisdom or efficiency); Mansell v. Mansell,
490 U.S. 581, 583, 594 (1989) (statutory protection of military retirees); Rodriguez v.
United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525, 526 (1987) (per curiam) (“Deciding what competing
values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the
very essence of legislative choice.”) (recognizing multiple statutory purposes); W. &
So. Life Ins. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648, 670 (1981); U. S. R.R.
Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 197 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Pulte Home Corp.
v. Montgomery Cty., 909 F.3d 685, 694 (4th Cir. 2018) (“It is not this court’s place to
second-guess the wisdom of elected local officials in making inherently discretionary
zoning decisions.”) (applying the deference principle not only to state governmental
legislative determinations, but to state administrative agency decisions as well); Cure
Land, L.L.C. v. USDA, 833 F.3d 1223, 1236 (10th Cir. 2016) (applying the deference
principle to judicial review of a federal administrative agency’s substantive decision
making priorities); Sensational Smiles, L.L.C. v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir.
2015) (upholding even “rent-seeking” legislation) (legislatures need not articulate
their motivating reasons); Bonidy v. USPS, 790 F.3d 1121, 1128 (10th Cir. 2015)
(applying the deference principle to a postal service regulation); Gordon v. Holder, 721
F.3d 638, 657 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (addressing congressionally-chosen means of
addressing illicit mail deliveries of tobacco); Martin v. Haas, 556 S.W.3d 509, 515 (Ark.
2018) (state court applying the deference principle to state legislative enactments).
15
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam)); see also Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. O’Neill, 499 U.S.
65, 78 (1999) (rejecting the judicial “superlegislature” role); Exxon Corp. v. Governor
of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 124 (1978) (paying deference to Maryland state statute); North
Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc. 414 U.S. 156, 165 (1973)
(“We refuse to sit as a ‘superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation[.]” (quoting
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963))).
16
Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313.
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further legislative response.17 The courts in such cases also do not
typically insist on any articulation by the legislature of its reasons,
purposes, or aims in enacting a statute.18 Nor need the legislature
typically offer any findings of fact to explain or to justify, as of the
time of its enactment,19 the statute in question.20 The courts seek
to justify this broad deference to legislative action in part based on
the belief that “absent some reason to infer antipathy, even
improvident [legislative] decisions will eventually be rectified
by the democratic process . . . .”21 A basic problem with this
optimistic belief, however, is that statutes and regulations which
utterly fail to serve any of their supposed public purposes—or
which actually make the perceived social problem worse—may be
quite stable and difficult to politically reverse if the policy
distinctly benefits some small and well-organized groups.22
This typical judicial reluctance to question whether a statute
or rule somehow advances one or more of its presumed purposes,
even after the statute or rule has been fully implemented and its
actual results can be readily investigated, is certainly not confined
to the equal protection context. The actual results of a challenged
government policy are also deemed largely irrelevant in,
for example, eminent domain cases.23 It has also been argued,
however ironically, that this broad judicial deference to
legislatures whenever basic constitutional rights are not at stake
“provides guidance and discipline for the legislature, which is

17

See id. at 316; Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
See, e.g., Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315; Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S.
1, 15 (1992).
19
It is, for our purposes, important that the cases focus almost entirely on the
justifiability of the statute at the time of legislative deliberation and enactment,
rather than on any degree of effectiveness of the statute post-enactment, after its
implementation, and thus in actual practice.
20
See, e.g., Beach Commc’ns. Inc, 508 U.S. at 315; Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 15;
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981); Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979).
21
Beach Commc’ns Inc., 508 U.S. at 314 (quoting Vance, 440 U.S. at 97) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
22
As classically argued in MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 3
(2012); MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 17 (1982); GORDON
TULLOCK, THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 185 (Charles Rowley ed. 2005); and in
summary form in William F. Shughart, II, Public Choice, ECONLIB, https://www.econ
lib.org/library/Enc/PublicChoice.html (last visited Sep. 14, 2019).
23
See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544–45 (2005); Kelo v. City
of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488–89 (2005) (focusing on merely predictive, ex ante,
preimplementation, prospective judgments by the public officials involved); Haw.
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242–43 (1984).
18
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entitled to know what sorts of laws it can pass.”24 It is, however,
unfortunately quite unclear how broad judicial deference to
legislatures in social and economic matters provides either
concrete “guidance”25 or meaningful “discipline”26 for legislatures.
One might well say, in the alternative, that judicial deference
commonly authorizes legislative or administrative action even
where that action can be shown to have failed in practice to
substantially advance any of its inferable purposes.
In some cases, fully appropriate post-enactment judicial
redress to injured parties may not be possible, even if it is now
clear that the policy is a complete failure. Even if a court officially
declared the failure of, say, the eminent domain scheme in Kelo v.
City of New London,27 it might not be feasible to reconstruct the
vanished homes and properties, let alone an entire community.28
But in most cases, some sort of creative judicial relief, in terms of
a carefully crafted injunction, monetary damages, or declaratory
relief, should be available to reduce the otherwise accumulating
private and public harms of evidently failed policies. Legislative
and administrative policies that have failed to substantially
or otherwise meaningfully advance any plausible public
purpose should thus be considered vulnerable to appropriate
judicial redress.
Perhaps the idea of judicially requiring merely a “realistically
conceivable”29 legislative public interest fairly expresses a single
uniform, less readily manipulable judicial review standard around
which courts should rally. Often, the legislative purposes sought
by a piece of legislation or rule will not be clear.30 But we need not
24

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
Id.
26
Id.
27
545 U.S. at 487–88. The development project in question metaphorically
collapsed. See Susette Kelo, I Still Feel the Pain of Losing My ‘Little Pink House,’
USA TODAY (Apr. 16, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/
04/16/private-land-seizure-pfizer-new-london-little-pink-house-column/507608002/;
Ilya Somin, Give Susette Kelo Her Land Back, REASON: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(May 25, 2018, 3:15 PM), https://reason.com/2018/05/25/give-susette-kelo-backher-land/.
28
But see Somin, supra note 27, for a constructive remedial suggestion in that
specific context.
29
As adopted in Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa
2004) (emphasis omitted), cert. denied sub nom Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent.
Iowa, 541 U.S. 1086 (2004); Horsfield Materials, Inc., v. City of Dyersville, 834 N.W.2d
444, 459 (Iowa 2013) (citation and internal quotation omitted).
30
See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 442 (1972) (“The legislative purposes that
the statute is meant to serve are not altogether clear.”). The plurality in Eisenstadt
25
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insist on evidence in legislative history that one or more legislators
consciously endorsed any particular purpose at the time of
legislative enactment.31 Ascertaining any specific statutory intent
is, of course, often problematic.32 Even if a contemporaneous
legislative intent could be determined, though, it might also be
sensible to consider post-enactment grounds and justifications.33
More radically, courts might begin to insist broadly upon at least
minimal legislative statements of intended legislative purpose.
A further complication is that any statute might well have
a number of purposes, whether those multiple purposes are
specified, ranked, or neither.34 As well, the legislative purposes at
issue may be of somewhat different sorts. Statutes may differ in
their emphasis on substantive purposes,35 as supposedly distinct
from what we might call symbolic,36 expressive,37 or public
identity-related, purposes.38 In some cases, a government policy
evidently found the likely dubious future effectiveness of the contraceptive restriction
to be evidence that certain specified purposes could not plausibly be ascribed to the
enacting legislature. See id. at 442–43.
31
See, e.g., Fantasy Ranch Inc. v. City of Arlington, 459 F.3d 546, 560 (5th
Cir. 2006).
32
See id.
33
See id. at 560–61. Not all unforeseen consequences of a statute need be adverse,
after all. Consider a tree planting program intended solely to promote local aesthetics
that also turns out to promote a healthier local environment and even local
business activity.
34
See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466–70 (1981);
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 470 (1981). Consider, as well, the possible
multiple purposes of governmental affirmative action programs, as elaborated in R.
George Wright, Cumulative Case Arguments and the Justification of Academic
Affirmative Action, 23 PACE L. REV. 1, 12–14, 19 (2002). It is also certainly possible
that the multiple legislative purposes may be, to one degree or another, in conflict.
35
A statute aimed at, say, flood control or infrastructure enhancement, will
typically have mostly substantive purposes.
36
For background, see MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 1–2
(2d ed. 1985). Perhaps every significant statute, though, has some element of symbolic
or expressive intent, whether the courts recognize this or not. Thus, it may be a
mistake to view, say, teenage video game anti-pornography ordinances as intended
solely to reduce some tangible, material harm, such as violent crime. But see Brown
v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799–801 (2011) (focusing largely on evidence of
some form of aggressiveness, or the lack thereof, apart from any more symbolic or
expressive purposes).
37
See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 2021, 2021–23 (1996).
38
Identity-establishing or identity-confirming legislation, as perhaps in the case
of immigration policy, can be motivated by a sense of “who we are,” which is
understood largely as a matter of who we presumably should be. Jamshed Dastur,
This Is Not Who We Are as Americans. Or Is It?, L.A. TIMES (Jul. 5, 2018),
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may involve an inseparable mixture of the substantive and the
nonsubstantive purposes.39 We can accept any reasonable account
of the nature of the purposes associated with a rule or statute.
Our primary concern, though, is not with the nature of the
interests cited in support of a given policy, but with whether any
such policy is, in practice, substantially advanced after its
implementation. Relatively narrow questions of whether there
has been substantial advancement of a given legislative purpose
can still, admittedly, be politicized to some limited degree. But
such questions are less readily, less broadly, and less
uninhibitedly manipulable by judges than the typically more
complex and multifaceted, if not largely arbitrary, inquiries as to
tailoring and the other dimensions of tiered scrutiny judgments.
Also, a court that adopts, in advance, even a general test for
determining the substantial versus insubstantial advancement of
a legislative policy is thereby more constrained by that simple test
than by typical forms of tiered scrutiny. And crucially, a judicial
inquiry into the substantial advancement of a legislative purpose
as merely a binary inquiry renders any further judicial concern
about degrees of advancement of a legislative purpose utterly
irrelevant. In classical tiers of scrutiny analysis, the court may
use an indefinite, if not infinite, number of degrees of purpose
fulfillment, importance of legislative purpose, and tailoring.
As it turns out, courts sometimes do require evidence, largely
or entirely pre-implementation, that a policy will have some
meaningful impact on the presumed social evil in question. In
general, the greater the significance of constitutional-level
considerations in a case, the greater the chances that a court will
probe the predicted likelihood that a legislative policy will have
some desired future effect.

https://www.latimes.com/socal/daily-pilot/opinion/tn-dpt-me-commentary-america20180705-story.html. The contrast would be with the familiar claim that some
unattractive phenomenon “is not who we are.” Id.
39
Consider the local downtown Christmas display policy litigated in the
Establishment Clause case of Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 670–71 (1984). One
could easily argue that the combined religious and secular elements of the seasonal
display had various purposes ranging from the purely commercial—to enhance local
downtown spending—to promoting civic and community pride, to the generally
celebratory, to symbolic, expressive, and local identity-confirming purposes, and then
to religious preference, favoritism, and advancement. It is even possible that the most
purely commercial motivations could not be optimized over time without the presence
of at least some perceivably religious symbols. See id. at 680–84.

2019] WIPING AWAY THE TIERS OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY

1127

Judicial inquiries into the substantiality of the advancement
of a purported government interest arise, in particular, in the
dormant commerce clause cases. Among the familiar dormant
commerce clause cases, for example, we find judicial scrutiny of a
state statute’s likely future effects, as distinct from actual current
effects, in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corporation,40 Hunt
v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,41 and
Southern Pacific Company v. Arizona.42 Typically, this judicial
inquiry into a state statute’s likely future effects then triggers
a largely unconstrained judicial balancing test,43 with the
assumed value of the state regulatory interest being somehow
weighed against the likely future adverse effects on the flow of
interstate commerce.44
The language of these dormant commerce clause cases
legitimizes a general judicial inquiry into the extent of a state
policy’s advancement. Judicial balancing then often follows.
Thus, “Regulations . . . may further the purpose so marginally and
interfere with commerce so substantially, as to be invalid under
the Commerce Clause.”45
A challenged state statute may
predictably do “remarkably little”46 to further the abstractly
permissible state interest and thus fail a generalized interest
balancing test.47 Even if only through prediction, courts thus
consider the likely effectiveness of the policy.
In cases moving toward the realm of individual federal
constitutional rights, the courts again tend to inquire, usually
predictively, into the fulfillment of the state regulatory purposes.
Thus in the commercial speech area, cases such as Central Hudson
Gas and Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission,48

40

450 U.S. 662, 670–71, 674–75, 677–78 (1981).
432 U.S. 333, 350–54 (1977), superseded in part by statute 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(1), as recognized in United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751
v. Brown Grp., 517 U.S. 544, 556–57 (1996).
42
325 U.S. 761, 781–82 (1945).
43
See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 670–71; Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352–53; S. Pacific Co., 325
U.S. at 775–76.
44
See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 670–71; Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352–53; S. Pacific Co., 325
U.S. at 775–76.
45
Kassel, 450 U.S. at 670.
46
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 353.
47
See, e.g., S. Pacific Co., 325 U.S. at 775–76. For an example of a much less
critical and more deferential judicial approach to the likely promotion of state
statutory interests in the dormant commerce clause context, see generally the local
baitfish case of Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
48
447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
41
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Edenfield v. Fane,49 and 44 Liquormart, Inc., v. Rhode Island50
allow for judicial inquiry into whether a regulation “provides only
ineffective or remote support,”51 for the government regulatory
interest at stake,52 or into whether the regulation “will in fact
alleviate [the targeted social harm] to a material degree.”53 The
court may thus require evidence of a future significant advance of
the government interest.54 In these and other areas,55 the courts
may in some instances56 require predictive evidence that the
government policy at issue will substantially advance a cognizable
government purpose.
Remarkably, some courts impose a similar predictive
standard, but under the grossly misleading rubric of a “tailoring”
inquiry.57 In these cases, the court’s assessment of the future
degree of success of the policy occurs, as in tiered scrutiny analysis,
through a judicial inquiry into the required degree of “tailoring” of
the state regulatory policy.
This odd judicial confusion of supposed policy effectiveness
with the supposed degree to which the regulation is tailored to its
target—and thereby to one supposed degree or another
overinclusive or underinclusive—occurs in various important
49

507 U.S. 761, 765 (1993).
517 U.S. 484, 495 (1996).
51
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564. It is not entirely clear
why support that is “remote” should be entirely discounted, in contrast with
“direct” support.
52
See id.
53
Edenfield, 505 U.S. at 771.
54
See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 505. For recent applications of a similar
requirement of a predicted alleviation of the targeted social harm to some material
degree, see, e.g., Italian Colors Rest. v. Becerra, 878 F.3d 1165, 1177 (9th Cir. 2018);
Missouri Broads. Ass’n v. Lacy, 846 F.3d 295, 301 (8th Cir. 2017); Kiser v. Kamdar,
831 F.3d 784, 789 (6th Cir. 2016).
55
See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984) (regarding constitutional
standing). Allen required the plaintiffs, at an early stage of the lawsuit, to show a
stronger likelihood that the sought-after change in IRS enforcement policy would
make a relevant and appreciable difference with respect to the plaintiffs’ interests.
See id. at 758.
56
But see, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148, 151–52 (1986), and in the
judicial standing area, the more accommodating mood in United States v. SCRAP, 412
U.S. 669, 683–90 (1973). See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
456, 466–68 (1981) (on the equal protection issue, but also more generally, disclaiming
any concern for any likely future impact of the statute in practice, as distinct
from merely whether the legislature “could rationally have decided that its ban on
plastic nonreturnable milk jugs might foster greater use of environmentally
desirable alternatives”). This is clearly a more deferential, less inquisitorial, more
backward-looking judicial standard.
57
For a sense of the basic confusion, see supra text accompanying note 7.
50

2019] WIPING AWAY THE TIERS OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY

1129

contexts. These contexts include equal protection,58 commercial
speech,59 and due process.60 The judicial confusion of tailoring with
questions of the policy’s impact can manifest in two ways. First,
questions of policy tailoring can be confused with questions of the
severity, inescapability, or weight of the policy’s burden on any
affected party, whether that burden was legislatively intended
or not. And second, questions of the policy’s tailoring may be
confused with questions of the policy’s effectiveness or the
practical purpose-fulfilling impact of the policy.
These judicial confusions are understandable as long as the
courts insist on addressing many constitutional problems through
one form or another of tiered scrutiny. Tiered scrutiny, after all,
normally involves an inquiry, first into the existence of a
governmental interest, and, second into the policy’s degree of
tailoring or fit.61 But crucially, these two inquiries tell us very
little about whether the policy is actually effective in practice or
about the real and inescapable severity of its constitutional impact
on any party.
Tiered scrutiny, in its most typical forms,62 thus largely
misses crucially important concerns. Often, we will want to know
whether a burdensome policy is effective, is largely ineffective, or
else amounts to a classic backfire that makes the initial problem
worse.63 There will likely be some public pressure for courts
58

See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–33 (1996) (“The search for the link
between classification and objective gives substance to the Equal Protection
Clause . . . [b]y requiring that the classification bear a rational relationship to an
independent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure that classifications are not
drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.”).
59
See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417–18 (1993)
(discussing trivial, “minute,” or “paltry” effect of the commercial speech regulation on
the perceived social problem as supposedly a matter of tailoring, or “the ‘fit’ between
the city’s goal and its method of achieving it”).
60
See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) (requiring, in the context of
limiting classic economic substantive due process, that “the [regulatory] means
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained”).
61
For systematic and historical accounts of the development of tiered scrutiny,
see Wright, supra note 1, at 169; White, supra note 2, at 65–80.
62
See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986). In a
very limited class of cases, the courts may apparently ignore matters of tailoring or fit
and focus instead on questions of any alternative courses of action that may remain
available to a plaintiff affected by a policy.
63
See Prashant Bharadwaj, Leah K. Lakdawala & Nicholas Li, Perverse
Consequences of Well Intentioned Regulation: Evidence From India’s Child Labor Ban
1, 1 NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. 2013 (discussing the problem of policy measures
with perverse unintended consequences); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse
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to consider such an obviously practical question, even if the
tiered scrutiny interest and tailoring inquiries do not call for
such consideration. And we will often want to know not merely
whether a party is unintentionally affected by a policy, but the
constitutional severity or weight of that effect, as well as whether
the unintentionally affected party could realistically avoid the
adverse effect at minimal constitutional value and financial cost.64
Tiered scrutiny typically does not inquire into any of this.
More broadly, applications of tiered scrutiny do not naturally
lend themselves to inquiring into a variety of practically crucial
matters. The degree of importance of a government interest does
not tell us whether the policy actually promotes that interest,
substantially or otherwise. And tailoring inquires do not naturally
measure the actual, constitutional, or practical impact of the policy
on any affected party.65 Degrees of tailoring, fit, overlap, and
underinclusiveness or overinclusiveness are, oddly, potentially
infinite in distinguishing among the relevant degrees and are also
merely two-dimensional. They can be fairly represented through
a variety of merely two-dimensional Venn diagrams.66 But the
degree of effectiveness of a policy, in practice, or the severity of its
impact, is unavoidably three-dimensional. Tiered scrutiny does
not typically address these vital matters.
We might, by imperfect analogy, think of the case of a meteor
impacting the earth. We will, in the aftermath, certainly want to
know about the two-dimensional scope or the geographic surface
area scope, coverage, or breadth of the meteor impact. But we will
also want to know about the three-dimensional matter of how
superficial, or how deep or severe, the impact of the meteor turned
out to be. But this analogy actually understates the problem for
tiered scrutiny. In matters of the law, we will often care at least
as much about the severity or weight of a burden on constitutional
rights as we do about the scope of the persons who are affected,
perhaps only trivially, thereby. In the law, some “meteor impacts”
are minimal, trivial, or readily avoidable at low cost.
Consequences of Disclosing Standard Terms, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 167 (2017).
More controversially, consider the conflicting assessments of the long-term effects of
typical rent control regulation. See infra notes 83 & 129 and accompanying text.
64
See Unnecessary Complexity, supra note 7, at 77. This inquiry is thus not merely
into degrees of unintended burdening, but into the availability, the monetary and
constitutional value costs, and the value of escape mechanisms for the adversely
affected party. See id.
65
See id. at 73.
66
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Typically, tiered scrutiny analysis thus misses out on this
important third dimension of actual impact, except when the
scrutiny analysis is confusedly expanded to somehow take depth
of impact or of policy fulfilment into account. Courts sometimes
do consider the actual impact of a policy when the stakes are at
their highest, in the course of applying either strict67 or some forms
of “exacting” or proportionate scrutiny.68 In these heightened
scrutiny cases, the court may seek to do a balancing of rights,
interests, benefits, or harms at stake, and then inquire, however
subjectively, into whether the policy is sufficiently tailored to the
government interest in question.69 For our purposes, the problems
with proliferating varieties of strict, exacting, and proportionate
tailoring are again their sheer manipulability and the lack of
meaningful constraint on the courts.70 Even in cases in which
constitutionally fundamental rights or constitutionally suspect
classifications are involved, courts tend to focus on readily
manipulable inquiries into the sufficiency of the legislative
tailoring.71 When constitutionally fundamental rights are at
stake, basic rule of law values instead require less judicial
manipulability and greater predictability of outcomes.
Basic rule of law values suggest that cases involving
constitutionally fundamental rights, in particular, should
not be addressed primarily through any familiar form of
readily-manipulable tiered scrutiny.
Matters such as the
judicially-perceived weight of the governmental regulatory

67
From among the wide range of strict scrutiny cases, see, e.g., Adarand
Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229, 236 (1995) (racial affirmative action
and equal protection); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418–21 (1989) (flag burning as
protected speech). For some fundamental complications, however, see generally R.
George Wright, Electoral Lies and the Broader Problems of Strict Scrutiny, 64 FLA. L.
REV. 759, 777–79 (2012).
68
The meaning of “exacting scrutiny” is currently unclear. See Wright, supra note
10, at 207. But a sense of the intuitive balancing and proportionalism often involved
therein is evident in cases such as United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012), and
in particular Justices Breyer and Kagan’s opinion, id. at 730–39 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
69
For background on the complications of narrow tailoring, see generally R.
George Wright, The Fourteen Faces of Narrowness: How Courts Legitimize What They
Do, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67 (1997).
70
See supra notes 67–69; see also R. George Wright, Content-Based and
Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech: The Limitations of a Common Distinction, 60
U. MIAMI L. REV. 333, 336 (2006).
71
See, e.g., the comparative emphasis in the law school admissions case of Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308–09 (2003) and the undergraduate admissions case of
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 246–47 (2003).
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interest, the perceived degree of tailoring, and the extent to which
the government interest is actually being advanced should be
subordinated when genuinely fundamental rights are at stake. A
genuinely fundamental right should not be subject, in particular,
to broad judicial weighing, balancing, or proportionality
inquiries,72 with the fundamental constitutional rights perhaps
being unpredictably balanced away.73
In this particular class of cases, the courts should either
require the government to pursue its interest without
substantially burdening the constitutionally fundamental right at
stake74 or establish that the right does not genuinely qualify as
fundamental.75 In an extreme case, a government with no other
viable options might choose to substantially violate the genuinely
fundamental right, mitigating the harm if possible, and then
paying full and appropriate damages.76 Tiered judicial scrutiny of
a purportedly rigorous sort is also applied in cases where no
constitutionally fundamental right is in jeopardy, but where some
sort of suspect or historically dubious legislative classification is
at stake.77 The question here becomes how to reform tiered
72

Proportionality inquiries into supposedly fundamental rights are increasingly
common. See, e.g., Aharon Barak, Proportionality, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 12–14 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Sajo eds.,
2012); Luc B. Tremblay, An Egalitarian Defense of Proportionality-Based Balancing,
12 INT’L J. CONST. L. 864, 865 (2014); Robert Alexy, Constitutional Rights, Balancing
and Rationality, 16 RATIO JURIS 131, 134 (2003).
73
This argument is classically made in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 198–99 (1977).
74
This would not require any kind of tailoring. The requirement would simply be
that the government policy not violate the fundamental right, with no further
requirement of narrow or any other form of tailoring imposed on any government
policy that does not also violate a constitutionally fundamental right.
75
We need take no position on what in particular should count as a
constitutionally fundamental right, as distinct from, say, a mere liberty interest, or
on how to determine such questions. We can accept any reasonable approach thereto.
For background and a sense of the ongoing contest, see, for example, Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148–50 (1968) (on fundamentality for due process
incorporation purposes); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123–24 (1989) (on the
respective roles of history and tradition as distinct from emerging insights);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710–11 (1997) (emphasizing consensual
recognition over time); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) (declining to
be bound by history and tradition); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05
(2015) (also declining to be bound by history and tradition).
76
This option can accommodate cases in which the broader public interest in the
enforcement of the policy is itself of inescapably crucial importance.
77
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (explicit race
discrimination as requiring strict scrutiny); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 209–10
(1976) (explicit gender discrimination as requiring intermediate scrutiny).
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scrutiny when no fundamental constitutional right is at stake,
but where the policy is intended to distinguish among persons
on suspect grounds or where it refers explicitly to suspect
classifications in distributing burdens and benefits.78
For the sake of simplicity, reduced scope for uncertainty,
reduced manipulability, and other rule of law values, it would be
ideal to remove suspect classification cases from the scope of tiered
scrutiny analysis. Doing so would clearly come at some cost to
some plaintiffs. But importantly, the most egregious suspect
classification cases will already be accommodated by strong
protection of constitutionally fundamental rights.79 That is, one
might reasonably judge a policy that is evidently intended to
invidiously discriminate against an identifiable class to thereby
violate a constitutionally fundamental right of that class.80 Both
material and dignitary concerns suggest that such invidious
classifications are often likely to burden constitutionally
fundamental rights. This category might even include some rare
instances of benignly-intended policies that affect traditionally
subordinated groups.81
Overall, then, we need something different than our current
complex and readily manipulable system of tiered judicial
scrutiny. And in minimizing plainly crucial issues of whether a
given policy actually, and not merely predictively, has any
substantial or otherwise meaningful impact on any social problem,
the tiered scrutiny system is often unpragmatic, unrealistic,
wasteful, and imprudent in operation.
In contrast, a judicial approach that avoids tiers of scrutiny
could validate constitutionally fundamental rights without any
manipulable inquiry into tailoring. The focus would be instead on
a less micromanipulable inquiry into whether the policy has
substantially or otherwise meaningfully advanced a cognizable
public interest. On this suggested approach, degrees of tailoring,

78
Thus, not every adverse impact on suspect classification grounds evokes
heightened scrutiny; proof of intent to discriminate, or at least an explicit reference to
a suspect classification, must also be shown. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 242 (1976) (racial public hiring case in absence of discriminatory intent applying
less than strict scrutiny).
79
See supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text.
80
For some of the possible approaches to reaching this result, see the cases cited
supra note 75.
81
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311, 343 (2003) (law school racial
affirmative action).
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among other considerations, would generally not matter. We now
turn to the question of how this form of judicial review could
operate, with an enhancement of pragmatic and rule of law values.
II. SUBSTANTIAL ACTUAL ADVANCEMENT OF A
COGNIZABLE PUBLIC PURPOSE
Any replacement for the tiers of scrutiny, especially where
fundamental constitutional rights are not at stake, should
recognize the sheer waste and inefficiency that is currently
encouraged by traditional minimum scrutiny review. The tiered
scrutiny cases normally involve judicial deference even to
minimally plausible, if not merely conceivable legislative
predictions as to the consequences of their legislation in practice.82
But legislation, no less than life itself, is rife with important
unanticipated consequences.83
In certain contexts, courts have sometimes acknowledged the
gulf between intended and actual policy consequences. Thus,
courts in administrative cases have recognized the difference
between an agency’s best guess as to a commodity price a year
into the future and the agency’s simple and uncontroversial
recognition of the actual price a year later.84 Later and fuller
information incorporating lived experience tends to be especially
valuable for useful decision-making.85 Actual implementation and
enforcement may generate crucial new information.86 This new
information may expose prior information gaps, fallacies, basic
misunderstandings, failures of the legislative imagination, and
the magnitude of legislative cognitive biases.87 In some instances,
82
See supra Part I. For a representative case, see, for example, Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery, Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981).
83
See, for example, Bharadwaj et al., supra note 63; Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note
63, as well as, classically, Frederic Bastiat, That Which Is Seen, and That Which Is
Not Seen (1850), https://bastiat.org/en/twistatwins.html; Robert K. Merton, The
Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 AM. SOC. REV. 894,
895 (1936). More particularly, see J.P. Mangalindan, California Privacy Law Will
Have ‘Unintended Consequences’: Google, YAHOO FIN. (Jul. 1, 2018), https://finance.
yahoo.com/news/california-privacy-law-will-unintended-consequences-google-121038
199.html.
84
See Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 284 U.S. 370,
390 (1932).
85
See generally id.; see also Richard Morgenstern, Retrospective Analysis of U.S.
Federal Environmental Regulation, 9 J. BENEFIT COST ANALYSIS 285, 287 (2018).
86
See Morgenstern, supra note 85, at 287.
87
See Morgenstern, supra note 85, at 287. See generally How to Reduce Bias in
Decision Making: A Part of the Comprehensive and Fully Integrated Framework for
Critical Thinking at the USC Marshall School of Business, USC MARSHALL CRITICAL
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courts have encouraged, if not required, administrative agencies
to revise their own rules based on the admitted differences
between an agency’s initial expectations and its later experiences
with the rule in actual practice.88 Courts often grant significant
latitude to administrative agency rules that are presumably
seeking to promote statutory goals.89 Initially, an agency’s largely
predictive judgment may suffice to justify an administrative rule.90
But at some point, accumulated experience with the actual
consequences of agency rules should trump an agency’s mere
initial predictions.91 An agency may thus sometimes be under a
“duty”92 to reassess and revise its own rules if the rules do not
“actually produce the benefits the [agency] originally predicted
they would.”93 A sensible pragmatism requires attention to actual,
as well as predicted, consequences of fallible administrative
agency judgments. Any other course merely sustains and
compounds initial policy mistakes. A judicial failure to assess new
and crucial experience in a litigated case may unfortunately reflect
the sunk cost fallacy,94 a status quo bias,95 institutional role
misunderstandings, or some other generally wasteful tendency.
It should be difficult to argue against the logic of greater
judicial attention to actual consequences of policies, as distinct
from fallible—and perhaps biased and self-serving—initial
predictions of consequences. Following through on this pragmatic
logic, however, coheres with our proposed requirement that

THINKING INITIATIVE 1, 4 (last visited Oct. 11, 2019), http://info.marshall.usc.edu/
faculty/critthink/Supplemental%20Material/Reducing%20Bias.pdf (listing and briefly
describing some of the most common and legislatively relevant decision-making
biases). See generally IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK (2d ed. 1982).
88
See Bechtel v. FCC, 957 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Syracuse Peace Council
v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 659–60 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Export-Import
Bank, 85 F. Supp. 3d 387, 418 (D.D.C. 2015) (internal quotation omitted).
89
See the statutory term interpretation case of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944), along with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
90
See, e.g., Bechtel, 957 F.2d at 881; Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 660.
91
See Bechtel, 957 F.2d at 881.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
The sunk cost fallacy can involve compounding an investment in what has
recently been discovered to have been a bad or inaccurate choice. See Jamie
Ducharme, The Sunk Cost Fallacy Is Ruining Your Decisions. Here’s How, TIME (July
26, 2018), https://time.com/5347133/sunk-cost-fallacy-decisions/.
95
Status quo bias can be seen even when the costs, in this case to agencies and
courts in particular, are low compared to the relatively high broader stakes. See
William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1989).
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evidence that the challenged policy has substantially or otherwise
meaningfully advanced at least one cognizable public policy
interest in practice be proferred.96
The idea of “substantiality,” and in particular of
“substantially” advancing an interest, is already familiar to us
from substantive due process97 and various other doctrines.98
Similarly, the idea of “substantially” burdening a right or interest
is familiar from various areas of the law.99 In these cases, the idea
of a “substantial” advance is what is known to philosophers as
a “thick” concept,100 in that it unavoidably partakes of both
descriptive and evaluative components.101 We need not here
recommend any particular understanding, whether narrow or
broad, rigorous or lax, of what constitutes a “substantial” advance
of an interest. There would be little sense in attempting to guess
in advance how to specify a concept when the point is, in part, to
encourage greater attention to how legislative intentions work out
96
Our focus on actual, as opposed to merely predicted or hoped-for, advance of a
cognizable interest borrows from and contributes to discussions of the proper role of
the doctrine of the ripeness of a case for adjudication. In the administrative law
context, there is a recurring issue as to whether a court should proceed to the merits
of a challenge to a rule or should instead wait until further information about the
actual impact of a rule, as felt in practice, has become available. Waiting for
post-implementation evidence was deemed unnecessary in the largely purely legal
case of Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). But in contrast, the Court
insisted upon waiting for later-accruing, concrete evidence of a rule’s effect in practice
in Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 812 (2003) (citing Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 82 (1978)). Our approach, in
mostly non-administrative contexts, understandably favors those challengers who, in
the absence of any fundamental right claim, can point to the failure of a policy, in
practice, on its own terms.
97
See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540–45 (2005)
(addressing the idea of “substantially advanc[ing]” a proffered state interest in
substantive due process cases, if not also in regulatory takings cases).
98
See, for example, the commercial speech case of Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135
S. Ct. 1656, 1678-79 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing recent free speech case law).
99
For background, see generally R. George Wright, Substantial Burdens in the
Law, 46 SW. L. REV. 1 (2015).
100
See, e.g., THICK CONCEPTS (Simon Kirchin ed. 2013); BERNARD WILLIAMS,
ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 140–42, 150–52 (1985). For clarity, one can
more easily think of ideas such as courage and cowardice as involving both description
of the actions in question and an assessment of their value or worthiness. Importantly,
in typical cases, assessments of courage and cowardice as “thick concepts” do not
especially lend themselves to manipulation. One could, in theory, refer to successfully
landing a damaged passenger plane on a river as “cowardly.” And one could, in theory,
refer to abandoning one’s family, in the face of a significant risk for some modest
payoff, as “courageous.” But these concepts are not as generally manipulable as those
involved in tiered scrutiny.
101
See supra note 100.
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in actual practice. Our recommendation thus would be that courts
should initially feel free to explore the practical consequences of
various approaches to what should count as a “substantial”
advance of a public interest.
After experimentation and reflection, the courts within a
given jurisdiction should ideally coordinate in adopting, as far as
possible, a uniform approach to the idea of substantiality, as in
substantial advance. This freely adopted and experientially
grounded judicial uniformity would then serve rule of law values
including simplicity, predictability, and justifiable constraint on
judicial discretion. The idea here is again that it would be
especially difficult for judges to game a specified idea of
substantiality than it is to game even one of the dimensions of
tiered scrutiny in such a way as to steer the outcome of a
controversial case. There is certainly greater likelihood of a
judicial consensus on the idea of “substantially” advancing an
interest than on how the application of the tiers of scrutiny should
be applied in given cases.
A similar approach should be applied to any significant
differences among courts, at least within a given jurisdiction, as to
how the courts should ascertain which possible governmental
interests should be taken into account in a given case. Of course,
the courts already face serious problems in determining the scope
of cognizable interests, purposes, and goals associated with a given
piece of legislation.102 Legislative intent, whether actual or merely
conceivable, may be obscure, divided, murky, self-contradictory,
and perhaps self-serving.103 The value of isolated or even
post-enactment statements of legislative purpose is always
debatable.104 Our approach in this respect is again not to resolve
such perennial issues on the merits here. The point is, for the sake
of pragmatic and rule of law values, to encourage courts
to voluntarily pursue increasing uniformity in ascertaining

102

For a recent survey of this inescapable general problem, see generally John F.
Manning, Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2397 (2017);
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV.
863 (1930); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987
DUKE L.J. 371 (1987).
103
See generally Manning, supra note 102, at 2400; Starr, supra note 102, at 375;
Posner, supra note 102; Radin, supra note 102, at 872.
104
For a useful discussion of particular approaches to determining cognizable
statutory purposes, see Vill. of Arlington Heights. v. Metro Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252,
266–69 (1977).
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legislative interests and purposes. Again, the scope of judicially
cognizable government purposes associated with a statute may
always be controversial to some degree, but the questions involved
do not match any obvious political or ideological divide. It seems
fair to say that political and ideological commitments do not
typically steer judges towards any consistent theory as to how to
ascertain the actual purposes of typical statutes or administrative
regulations. Legislative purposes can, on our approach, be
somehow ascertained and then judged in individual cases to have
been substantially advanced, in practice, with reduced
opportunities for case-by-case judicial manipulation on political or
ideological grounds.
It would certainly be useful, though, to have some tentative
sense of how judicially requiring the substantial advancement of a
cognizable public legislative purpose might work. In this regard,
courts can draw upon the experiences now emerging from the
administrative agency practice of what is called retrospective or
“look-back” review.105 An administrative agency’s retrospective
105
For discussions of retrospective review of an agency’s rules in the United
States and internationally, see, for example, Joseph E. Aldy, Learning From
Experience: An Assessment of the Retrospective Reviews of Agency Rules and the
Evidence For Improving the Design and Implementation of Regulatory Policy,
ADMIN. CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES 8–64 (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.acus.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/Aldy%2520Retro%2520Review%2520Draft%252011-172014.pdf; Cary Coglianese, Measuring Regulatory Performance: Evaluating the
Impact of Regulation and Regulatory Reform, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 7 (August 2012), https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatorypolicy/1_coglianese%20web.pdf [hereinafter Measuring]; Cary Coglianese, Moving
Forward with Regulatory Lookback, 30 YALE J. REG. 57, 58–59 (2013) [hereinafter
Moving Forward]; Maureen Cropper, Arthur Fraas & Richard Morgenstern,
Looking Backward to Move Regulations Forward, 355 SCIENCE 1375, 1375 (Mar. 31,
2017); HM TREASURY, THE MAGENTA BOOK: GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATION 5 (Apr.
2011), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/220542/magenta_book_combined.pdf; Sofie E. Miller, Learning
from Experience: Retrospective Review of Regulations in 2014, at 16–18
(Nov. 2015) (working paper on file with the George Washington University
Regulatory Studies Center), https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/g/
files/zaxdzs1866/f/Retrospective%20Review%20in%202014_MillerS_11_3.pdf;
Richard Morgenstern, Retrospective Analysis of U.S. Federal Environmental
Regulation, 9 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 285, 296–300 (2018); Connor Raso, Assessing
Regulatory Retrospective Review Under the Obama Administration, BROOKINGS (Jun.
15, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/assessing-regulatory; Regulatory
Impact Analysis: A Tool for Policy Coherence, OECD, Regulatory Impact Analysis: A
Tool for Policy Coherence (2009), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/regulatoryimpact-analysis_9789264067110-en#page1; Retrospective Review of Agency Rules,
ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S. (Dec. 9, 2014), www.acus.gov/recommendation/
retrospective-review-agency-rules; Cass R. Sunstein, The Regulatory Lookback, 94
B.U. L. REV. 579, 592–96 (2014); Jonathan Wiener & Daniel L. Ribiero, Environmental
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review of an agency’s current rules is typically conducted by the
agency itself and thus often involves no cross-branch
interaction.106 Therefore, the guidance for the courts from
the current practice of retrospective review is indirect and
merely suggestive.
But looking to the overall experience
with retrospective agency review of administrative rules can
nonetheless provide useful insights for courts reviewing statutes
and rules.
Retrospective review experience, for example, indicates that a
regulation—and by obvious implication, a statute—can be in some
respect effective, or merely ineffective, but may also completely
backfire107 by making the perceived social problem worse than it
might otherwise have been.108 Rules and statutes can also initially
be harmless or even beneficial in some respects but then
become antiquated and obsolete.109 Retrospective administrative
agency review can also add to our understanding of how
later-arriving information can dramatically improve upon initial
perceptions and understandings that were formulated on largely
speculative grounds.110
Importantly, studies of retrospective agency review, and in
particular of the typical agency reluctance to undertake such
review, illustrate the crucial need for other institutions to take up
the review process where an agency or legislature is disinclined to
Regulation Going Retro: Learning Foresight from Hindsight, 32 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 1, 21–22 (2016). For a sense of some agency incentives toward something akin to
retrospective review as more formally understood, see Wendy Wagner, et al., Dynamic
Rulemaking, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 183, 216–20 (2017). For discussion of a possible
congressionally mandated judicial review of an agency’s preenactment regulatory
impact analysis, see Reeve Bull & Jerry Ellig, Judicial Review of Regulatory Impact
Analysis: Why Not the Best?, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 759–61 (2017).
106
See supra note 105.
107
See Moving Forward, supra note 105, at 57.
108
See Bharadwaj et. al, supra note 63, at 1; Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 63, at
167; Bastiat, supra note 83, at 2; Merton, supra note 83, at 894; Mangalindan, supra
note 83, at 1; see also PETER M. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN 34–35
(2014) (“[C]ampaign finance regulation, which its advocates claimed would ‘take the
money out of politics,’ has done pretty much the opposite . . . .”).
109
See Moving Forward, supra note 105, at 57–58; see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 2–3 (Harvard Univ. Press Ed. 2009) (on the
possible mechanics of addressing perceived statutory obsolescence).
110
See Morgenstern, supra note 105, at 287 (explaining that while information on
ex post circumstances is likely to be imperfect, our post-enactment understanding of
the actual effects of a policy are clearly likely to be much more accurate than our
understanding at the time of the enactment of a policy). For a judicial recognition of
this phenomenon, see Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 284 U.S.
370, 389–90 (1932).
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do so.111 Agencies and legislatures may both reasonably believe
that focusing on trending issues may score more political points
than reexamining previously adopted rules or legislation.112 There
is, after all, a serious risk that previously adopted rules and
legislation may be found to be ineffective, or even perverse, with
respect to their touted purposes.113 This could well involve
awkward admissions. One obvious response to these incentives is
to have other governmental entities, including the courts,
legitimately assume increased initiative and responsibility.114
Agencies may thus shy away from serious retrospective
analysis, even when formally required by statute to plan for and
undertake such reviews.115 The rewards to an agency, or to
legislators, from showing116 that its adopted policies indeed had
some already anticipated, publicized, and desired effect may be
outweighed by a showing117 that the policy did not in fact
meaningfully contribute toward any recognized public purpose.
Thus, even an inexpert court, if adversarially well-informed, may
often be a better source of a meaningful retrospective review.118
The inevitable limitations of nonspecialized courts, however, also
suggest limits on the scope of a court’s authority to reassess the
effects of legislative and regulatory enactments. Courts are
relatively well-suited to determine the general goals of legislation.
And courts can reasonably address the task of determining
whether a challenged policy substantially advances, in actual
practice, any specified public purpose, again absent any claims of
fundamental constitutional rights violations.
111

See Wiener & Ribiero, supra note 105, at 7.
See id. at 7, 23.
113
See id. at 7.
114
See id. at 7 n.44.
115
See Miller, supra note 105, at 3.
116
See, e.g., Retrospective Review of Agency Rules, supra note 105, at 3.
117
See id.
118
Of course, whether the consequences of a policy are investigated by the agency
involved, by the courts, or by some other entity, the work of teasing out the most
important causal relationships in a complex and constantly evolving social
environment, making judgments as to the likely causal effects and as to what might
have happened in the absence of the policy, or under some alternative to that policy,
will always be difficult at best. See, e.g., Measuring, supra note 105, at 7; Cropper,
supra note 105, at 1376 (noting that useful “control group[s]” will not always be
available for comparison); THE MAGENTA BOOK, supra note 105, at 19. Beyond some
point, of course, even the best-informed courts, with the fullest data, may rightly be
unsure as to causality. See, for example, the discussion by Justice Breyer in the violent
video game aggression case of Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 853 (2011)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
112

2019] WIPING AWAY THE TIERS OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY

1141

However, courts also lack any absolute or even any
comparative advantage119 over legislatures, agencies, or various
nongovernmental associations beyond this initial threshold
inquiry120 We should not replace the tiers of scrutiny with a
system that authorizes generalized courts to try to broadly assess
or compare the various tangible and intangible, short-term and
long-term, direct and indirect costs of a policy and its alternatives
and then somehow evaluate the policy’s relevant qualities, costs,
and benefits.121 Of course, it is technically possible to think of a
119
See generally R. George Wright, At What Is the Supreme Court Comparatively
Advantaged?, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 535, 556 (2013).
120
Thus, courts in a post-tiers of scrutiny regime should not seek to determine
which policies would maximize social and economic benefits, let alone which policies
would maximize benefits net of their costs. Such efforts, if undertaken at all, can best
be left to agencies, whatever their own biases and limitations. See Aldy, supra note
105, at 15.
121
For some of the remarkable, and often inescapable, complications of various
forms of cost-benefit analysis, see, for example, MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A.
POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 6 (2006) (distinguishing
well-being from economic efficiency and emphasizing the important differences among
kinds of preferences); E.J. MISHAN & EUSTON QUAH, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (5th ed.
2007); B. GUY PETERS, ET AL., DESIGNING FOR POLICY EFFECTIVENESS 1 (2018)
(“Effectiveness serves as the basic goal of any design, upon which other goals, such
as efficiency and equity, are built.”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT
REVOLUTION (2018); Jennifer Baxter, Lisa Robinson & James Hammitt, White Paper:
Retrospective Cost Benefit Analysis, DATA-SMART CITY SOLUTIONS (Apr. 20, 2015),
https://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/white-paper-retrospective-benefitcost-analysis-664 (noting the problem of the cumulative burdens of multiple policies);
Rachel Bayefsky, Note, Dignity as a Value in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 123 YALE L.J.
1732, 1738–39 (2014) (on the inclusion of incommensurable dignity, in an
unmonetized form, in cost benefit analyses); Daniel A. Farber, Breaking Bad? The
Uneasy Case For Regulatory Breakeven Analysis, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1469, 1472 (2014)
(cognitive biases as commonly affecting a breakeven analysis); Gregory C. Keating, Is
Cost-Benefit Analysis the Only Game in Town?, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 195, 198–99 (2018)
(contrasting consequentialist and deontological approaches; benefit and harm
asymmetries; and considering optimal levels of grave harms); RICHARD LAYARD &
STEPHEN GLAISTER, INTRODUCTION, IN COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (1994); Allan
McConnell, Policy Success, Policy Failure, and Grey Areas in Between, 30 J. PUB. POL’Y
345 (2010) (on the multiple dimensions and magnitudes of a policy’s success and
failure, along with the multiplicity of possible causal influences and scenarios); Allan
McConnell, What Is Policy Failure? A Primer to Help Navigate the Maze, 30 PUB. POL’Y
& ADMIN. 221 (2015); David Marsh & Allan McConnell, Towards a Framework For
Establishing Policy Success, 88 PUB. ADMIN. 564 (2010); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A.
Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102
CORNELL L. REV. 87 (2016); Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis:
Thirty Six Questions (and Almost as Many Answers), 114 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 177–88
(2014) (discussing problems of wide disparities in the ranges of predicted costs and
benefits; unascertainable probabilities; variability in cost-benefit ratios under
alternative probability assumptions; crucial differences among alternative discount
rates; risk reductions that lead to increased risks in other respects; quantification and
the values of privacy and dignity; and the sheer magnitude of costs or benefits versus
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fundamental rights violation as a kind of “cost.” But it is also still
sensible to allow courts to determine, in particular, the presence
or absence of a fundamental constitutional rights violation. This
particular task is rightly recognized as properly the distinctive
province of the courts.122
The limited task of judging whether a given legislative goal
has been substantially advanced in practice is merely a single
narrow element of the much more ambitious, complex, uncertain,
and deservedly controversial process of broad cost-benefit
analysis, which in turn comes in a wide range of varieties.123 The
exercise of expert policy discretion in the context of multiple basic
uncertainties is close to the essence of cost-benefit analysis.124 At
this task, nonexpert general jurisdiction courts generally have no
absolute or comparative advantage.125 Generally permitting
courts to subject legislative policy decisions to any form of
cost-benefit analysis would again undermine basic rule of law
values126 such as simplicity, predictability, and constraint on
judicial discretion and subjectivity. There would be costs as well

ratios of costs and benefits); OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, VALIDATING
REGULATORY ANALYSIS: 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COST AND BENEFITS
OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND
TRIBAL ENTITIES 41 (2005), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/
omb/assets/OMB/inforeg/2005_cb/final_2005_cb_report.pdf (“[P]eople may value
actual lost benefits differently than anticipated benefits.”); Matthew Walmsley,
Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Commitment Device, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 447, 455–61 (2015)
(noting the increasing obsolescence over time of the assumptions underlying both cost
and benefit assumptions).
122
See, for example, the unresolved complications referred to parenthetically
supra note 121. For the merest inkling of some of complications of judicial
examinations of cost-benefit analyses, see Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d
1201, 1222–23 (5th Cir. 1991). For a classic divided judicial response to some related
problems, see the several opinions in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 6, 66, 68, 69, 70
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc). For a confessedly rare endorsement of the court’s second
guessing of the agency’s cost-benefit analysis in Corrosion Proof Fittings, see Jonathan
S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role, 85 U. CHI. L.
REV. 935, 955 (2018).
123
For some indication of these further complications, see the literature referred
to supra note 121.
124
Consider merely the question of how to approach valuations and comparisons
involving human dignity, as noted in Bayefsky, supra note 121, at 1735–36; Cass R.
Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1369, 1377–78 (2014).
125
See Wright, supra note 119, at 545.
126
See the authorities cited supra note 4.

2019] WIPING AWAY THE TIERS OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY

1143

to the separation of powers, to matching discretionary political
power with political accountability, and even in discouraging the
judicial professional virtue of reasonable judicial humility.127
This means that courts should, unless otherwise authorized,
avoid undertaking any familiar form of broad and largely
discretionary cost-benefit analysis. There are admittedly some
instances in which courts might, up to a point, usefully critique
programs where the substantial advancement of a government
interest comes at the expense of other important interests, or with
an excess of sheer waste.128 Consider, for example, the costs often
associated with the assumedly substantial benefits, in some
respects, of typical programs of residential rent control,129
occupational licensing requirements,130 attempts at educational
127
See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centred
Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 205–06 (2003); R. George Wright, The
Rule of Law: A Currently Incoherent Idea That Can Be Redeemed Through Virtue, 43
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1142–43 (2015).
128
As accounted for in MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 227–
28 (1982); GORDON TULLOCK, THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 4 (Charles K. Rowley ed.,
Liberty Fund 2005).
129
Overall, typical residential rent control regulations are commonly disfavored
by economists on various grounds. See, e.g., Blair Jenkins, Rent Control: Do
Economists Agree?, 6 ECON. J. WATCH 73, 106 (2009); Walter Block, A Critique of the
Legal and Philosophical Case for Rent Control, 40 J. BUS. ETHICS 75, 75 (2002);
Rebecca Diamond, Timothy McQuade & Franklin Qian, The Effects of Rent Control
Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence From San Francisco,
CATO INST. (April 18, 2018), www.cato.org/publications/research-briefs-economicpolicy/effects-rent-control; Rent Control, CHI. BOOTH IGM FORUM (Feb. 7, 2012, 8:08
AM), www.igmchicago.org/surveys/rent-control. But the Supreme Court of the United
States has legitimized such rent control programs, at least under traditional
minimum scrutiny standards. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 13–14
(1988). Such programs can also provide long-term, as well as short-term, benefits to
some parties. See, e.g., Rebecca Diamond, What Does Economic Evidence Tell Us
About the Effects of Rent Control?, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 18, 2018),
www.brookings.edu/research/what-does-economic-evidence; Margaret Jane Radin,
Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 359–60, 370 (1986) (noting the
value of maintained personal property and sustained community). For a broad survey,
see generally Lisa Sturtevant, The Impacts of Rent Control: A Research Review and
Synthesis, NMHC RES. FOUND. (May 2018), https://www.nmhc.org/globalassets/
knowledge-library/rent-control-literature-review-final2.pdf.
130
See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 129–31 (2002 ed.);
Morris Kleiner & Alan B. Kruger, Analyzing the Extent and Influence of Occupational
Licensing on the Labor Market, 31 J. LABOR ECON. 173, 198 (2013) (noting the lesser
impact of government certification, as opposed to mandatory licensing requirements).
For a sense of the existing case law on current tiers of scrutiny analysis, Niang v.
Carroll, 879 F.3d 870, 873 (8th Cir. 2018), dismissed as moot sub nom. Niang v.
Tomblinson, 139 S. Ct. 319 (2018) (mem.); St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215,
227 (5th Cir. 2013) (a statutory occupational barrier to entry into the trade of casket
making as not rationally related to any legitimate state interest); Sensational Smiles,
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quality reform,131 and the so-called “war on drugs.”132 But even in
these subject matter areas, it is far from clear that courts would,
in practice, typically outperform legislatures or specialized
agencies, especially as the relevant actors are moved by newly
emerging and increasingly political pressures.
CONCLUSION
In some cases, political movements may inspire desirable
policy change without any crucial judicial intervention.133 Perhaps
this should happen more often than it does.134 But the replacement

LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 286–87 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing cases to the contrary,
including St. Joseph Abbey, but then upholding mere rent-seeking legal barriers to
occupational entry by potential competitors); Patel v. Texas Dep’t Licensing &
Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 90 (Tex. 2015) (licensing rules as violating the substantive
due process rights of commercial eyebrow threaders in a “burdensome” and
“oppressive” fashion).
131
Note the actual consequences and aftermath of the once touted No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001, as ultimately superseded by the Every Student Succeeds Act of
2015. See generally, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115
Stat. 1425 (2002); Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat.
1802 (2015) (devolving much authority to the individual states); Laura Adler-Greene,
Every Student Succeeds Act: Are Schools Making Sure Every Student Succeeds, 35
TOURO L. REV. 11, 12–14, 18–20 (2019). Note also the much broader option of the
statutory “sunsetting” of legislation. See generally Brian Baugus & Feler Bose,
Sunset Legislation: Balancing the Legislature and the Executive, MERCATUS CENTER
(August 2015), https://www.mercatus.org/publications/regulation/sunset-legislationstates-balancing-legislature-and-executive.
132
See, e.g., Christopher J. Coyne & Abigail R. Hall, Four Decades and Counting:
The Continued Failure of the War on Drugs, CATO INST. (Apr. 12, 2017),
www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/four-decades-and-counting; The War on
Drugs, ACLU (2019), https://www.aclu.org/issues/smart-justice/sentencing-reform/
war-drugs; George P. Shultz & Pedro Aspe, The Failed War On Drugs, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 31, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/12/31/opinion/failed-war-on-drugs.html.
133
Consider the congressional response to, for example, the No Child Left Behind
Act, supra note 131. The electoral politics of the War on Drugs may also be shifting.
See, e.g., Tom Angell, Kamala Harris Calls for Legalizing Marijuana and Ending the
War on Drugs in New Book, FORBES (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tom
angell/2019/01/08/kamala-harris-calls-for-legalizing-marijuana-and-ending-war-ondrugs-in-new-book/#65fb7dae2eee (book review). It is, more broadly, possible for
Congress to statutorily authorize courts to in effect repeal what is assumed to have
been initially appropriate but is now thought to be “obsolete” or “outmoded”
legislation, subject to possible legislative reenactment. This is the well-known
proposal embodied in GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
59 (1982). For responses to Judge Calabresi’s proposal, see generally Archibald Cox,
70 CAL. L. REV. 1463 (1982); Allan C. Hutchison & Derek Morgan, The Calabresian
Sunset: Statutes in the Shade, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1752 (1982).
134
See PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN AND HOW IT CAN
DO BETTER 59 (2014) (“Occasionally, government officials acknowledge that one of
their long-standing policies has failed and should be abandoned. Such confessions of
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for tiered judicial scrutiny argued for herein does not leave the
public without crucial protections against well-entrenched but
failed legislation.135 On our approach, courts would not attempt to
engage in broadly discretionary cost-benefit analysis136 but would
also certainly not defer generally to legislative action.137 Our
approach would insist, instead, on a showing that the legislation,
in actual practice, substantially or otherwise meaningfully
promotes any one or more of the public purposes or goals
reasonably ascribable to the legislation in question.138 As well, on
our suggested approach, any meaningful violation of a party’s
fundamental constitutional rights139 should result not in the
application of any form of tiered judicial scrutiny, but, more
predictably, in a judgment and redress for that injured party.140
More generally, the reforms suggested above simultaneously
promote more effective legislation, the reduction of legislative
waste, fuller respect for basic constitutional rights, and various
uncontroversial elements of the rule of law,141 including simplicity,
predictability, and a reduced scope for judicial subjectivity and
undue discretion, along with an appropriate respect for the
separation of powers.

governmental error are to be strongly encouraged, of course, but they are usually
belated and exceedingly rare.”).
135
See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 14–15
136
See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 121 and accompanying text.
137
See cases cited supra notes 14–15.
138
See supra Part II. For concerns as to the proper timing of judicial review, see
supra note 96.
139
We assume that tiered scrutiny analysis, including exacting scrutiny and strict
scrutiny, will tend to be more practically manipulable by any given court than will the
prior question of whether a fundamental constitutional right claim is present to begin
with. For a sense of historical trends in the latter context, see cases cited supra
note 75.
140
See supra notes 72–81 and accompanying text.
141
Among the most widely cited elements of the rule of law are: (1) the ability of
governed parties to reasonably know, in advance, of the considerations likely to
effectively determine judicial outcomes; (2) the minimization or reduction of
what amounts to retroactive legal determinations; (3) avoidance of frequent or
unpredictable substantial changes in what the law is held to require or permit;
(4) reasonable clarity, consistency, and stability in the law, particularly in its
application through administrative decrees and judicial decisions; and (5) appropriate
limits on executive discretion. Many of these basic rule of law themes are shared
among the authors cited supra note 4. For a concise and representative example, see
Lord Bingham, The Rule of Law, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 67, 67–83 (2009). See also BRIAN
Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW 1–8 (2007);
R. George Wright, The Magna Carta and the Contemporary Rule of Law Problem, 54
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 243, 243–44 (2016); Wright, supra note 127, at 1125–27.

